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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to explore whether support for the welfare state is lower if people are
made aware of its costs. Using data from a series of survey experiments in the German Internet Panel,
we analyse individual spending preferences for different areas of the welfare state and support for
redistribution. Tax constraints lead to lower support for unemployment benefits and for redistribution.
Tax constraints do not affect support for more spending on pensions, healthcare, and long-term care.
We consider whether the effect of tax constraints varies with pre-existing political attitudes or with
individual material circumstances. We find little evidence that a political ideology makes respondents
more responsive to tax constraints. However, we find some support that low income respondents
are less responsive to the tax constraint and maintain their high support despite its costs. Attitudes
towards the welfare state are not independent of attitudes towards taxation, and we conclude that
our understanding of public attitudes might considerably benefit from combining these different
strands of the literature.
Keywords: public opinion; welfare state attitudes; social policy preferences; trade-offs; tax
1. Introduction
The welfare state enjoys high popularity in European countries, and public opinion is
commonly seen to oppose welfare cuts [1,2]. At the same time, tax increases are usually very
unpopular [3–6]. Such a combination of attitudes—sometimes referred to as a something for nothing
paradox [7,8]—considerably restricts policy makers’ leeway to enact reforms and react to increasing
reform pressures. Public opinion is often portrayed as a veto player, blocking any reform attempts [9].
It is somewhat surprising though that retrenchment took place [10] and that we have seen recalibration
and reforms even in areas of the welfare state that enjoy the highest popularity, such as pensions [11].
One possible explanation for why reforms are possible are trade-offs between policy areas, i.e.,
welfare priorities, or also reform packages, which might be supported even if respondents do not support
every aspect of it (for other explanations, such as blame avoidance strategies, for example, see [12,13]).
Support for the welfare state, and, hence, also opposition to retrenchment, might be considerably lower
if people are made aware of the costs associated with more welfare state spending [3,7,14]. Moreover,
respondents might be willing to accept retrenchment in one area of the welfare state if they have a strong
priority to expand spending in other areas of the welfare state [14]). A higher retirement age might be
acceptable if this ensures that pension benefit levels remain stable [15]. In this paper, we add to these
recent trends in welfare attitudes research and explore whether people engage in trade-offs between
welfare state spending and redistribution on the one hand and tax increases on the other. Is support for
the welfare state and support for redistribution lower if respondents are made aware of the costs and
possible tax increases that are related to more welfare state spending?
Using data from a series of survey experiments in the German Internet Panel, we analyse
individual spending preferences for different areas of the welfare state and individual support
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for redistribution. Relying on a survey experiment allows us to raise respondents’ awareness of
tax increases if they decide to increase spending or want more redistribution. We find important
differences in the effect of tax constraints on attitudes between areas of the welfare state. In line with
previous research, tax constraints (i.e., priced items) lead to lower average support for unemployment
benefits and lower support for redistribution. In contrast, tax constraints did not affect the high
support for more governmental spending on pensions, healthcare, and long-term care. This pattern
supports expectations that taxes for economically and socially concentrated benefits are protested
most, whereas taxes that confer rather universal entitlement to benefits are protested least [6]. Finally,
we consider whether the effect of tax constraints varies with pre-existing political attitudes or with
individual material circumstances. We find little evidence that a pre-existing critical stance on taxes
makes respondents more responsive to tax constraints as left and right leaning respondents do not
differ in their reaction to the tax treatment. However, we find some support for the expectation
that potential beneficiaries and the economically vulnerable who are less likely to pay taxes are less
responsive to the tax constraint and maintain their high support despite its costs.
Our contribution here is twofold. First, we add to recent contributions in welfare attitudes
research, which has focused on trade-offs between attitudes towards social investment and education,
by extending this line of research to other areas of the welfare state, such as pensions and healthcare,
and by also examining more general redistribution preferences. Our results clearly show that tax
constraints do not have a homogeneous effect on attitudes across different areas of the welfare state
and that, in particular, more universal programs, such as pensions or healthcare, are not affected by
these tax constraints. Second, we re-emphasize a long-standing claim in the literature that attitudes
towards the welfare state are not independent of attitudes towards taxation [16–18], and that our
understanding of public attitudes might considerably benefit from combining these different strands
of the literature (see also [3,7]).
2. Theory and Hypothesis
Substantial research on public opinion shows that survey respondents tend to express high degrees
of support both for more social spending and for lower taxes when not confronted with potential
tradeoffs [3,7,8,16–18]. This observation is usually called the “More for Less” or the “Something for
Nothing” paradox, and research has attributed these inconsistent attitudes to individuals’ bounded
rationality and knowledge and to respondents’ fiscal illusion, i.e., that they are unable to estimate
the true costs of the tax and welfare system [8,17]. More recent contributions have raised our
awareness that such attitudes could also be interpreted as purely rational and that it is the basic
idea of free-riding that people want to benefit from a public good, but not to pay for it [7]. As to
the consequences of an increasing awareness for taxes on attitudes, both approaches yield the same
expectation. A survey item that asks about increased spending on different social policy programs or
for support for redistribution without mention of the policy’s potential cost is likely to yield a higher
level of support that the policy would obtain if some costly tradeoff was explicitly mentioned.
Hypothesis 1. Individual support for increasing spending in different areas of the welfare state and support for
redistribution drops once trade-offs between the respective policy and tax increases are explicitly acknowledged.
Existing empirical studies support this expectation. On average, support for educational
spending [14] and for day care or libraries [8], but also for families and social assistance [7], goes down
if respondents are made aware about the costs of increased spending. Nevertheless, we lack studies
that also cover other areas of the welfare state where it might be less likely to observe changes in
support due to tax constraints. For example, Barnes’ [3] results suggest that respondents are well aware
of the costs of health care and pensions, and only finds delinking of tax and spending preferences for
unemployment benefits. In this paper, we argue that it is important to distinguish between different
areas of the welfare state and, more importantly, we argue that the effect of tax constraints on attitudes
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is likely to vary between areas of the welfare state. If benefits of a policy are likely to be concentrated
on a comparable few users, and some people might not expect to be a beneficiary of this policy at all,
opposition against taxes for these economically and socially concentrated benefits should be strongest.
In contrast, if a policy program confers rather universal entitlement to benefits, many people expect to
benefit from the program at some point during their life course and deservingness of the recipients is
high, tax constraints should have little effect on support for these programs [6]. Hence, we expect:
Hypothesis 2. Tax constraints lead to lower average support for spending on policies that provide concentrated
benefits (such as unemployment benefits of redistribution), but do not affect support for policies that provide
rather universal benefit entitlement, such as pensions, healthcare, or long-term care.
In addition to the differences in support between areas of the welfare state, welfare attitudes
have been concerned with the individual determinants of spending and redistribution preferences.
The literature usually distinguishes two main motives to support the welfare state, self-interest and
values. Explanatory power of these constructs seems to be surprisingly weak though. Indicators of
self-interest and values usually explain only between 3 percent and 10 percent of the individual
variance in individual attitudes towards the welfare state. Moreover, differences in support for the
welfare state, between, for example, the net payers and the net receivers of welfare, are surprisingly
weak [19], and also partisan differences on the issue are sometimes less strong than one would expect.
Some authors argue that priced items lead to more considerate and accurate measurement of attitudes,
which better reflect respondents’ self-interest, but also their partisan agreement [20]. We focus here on
two social or political groups that have gained the most attention in the literature and seem to have
the highest relevance for the political economy of reforms: Political ideology and income.
First, we expect that political ideology moderates the effect that tax constraints have on attitudes.
When people receive information that is at odds with their pre-existing attitude, their political
predisposition, they are supposed to engage in ‘motivated reasoning’: They seek out information that
confirms prior attitudes, view evidence consistent with prior opinions as stronger, and spend more time
counter-arguing and even dismissing evidence inconsistent with their opinion, regardless of objective
accuracy [21]. Hence, the increased salience of the costs of the welfare state and the anticipation of
tax increases should have a particularly strong effect on right-leaning respondents who tend to be
much more opposed to high taxes than left-leaning respondents are. Providing information on the tax
consequences of increased welfare state spending might provide them with a justification to reduce
support for the welfare state and redistribution.
Hypothesis 3. The effect of tax constraints on welfare state attitudes is stronger for right-leaning people than
for people with a centre or left-leaning political ideology.
The standard approach to explain support for the welfare state and for redistribution preferences
relies on self-interest as the main explanatory determinant: Those that benefit from the welfare state
and redistribution will support it, whereas those that pay more in taxes and contributions than they
receive in benefits oppose more spending on welfare and redistribution. Accordingly, one’s relative
income position is key in shaping individuals’ preferences. The empirical evidence for an income
gradient in welfare state and redistribution preferences is surprisingly weak and the conflict between
the rich and the poor over the distribution of income and wealth within society is not as strong as
theoretical arguments would suggest [22–26]. Research has extended the basic model of preference
formation to explain the mismatch between theory and evidence. Expectations about social mobility
and risk perceptions have been added to the utility function of actors, and other regarding preferences,
like altruism and inequality aversion, also shape individual support for redistribution. In this paper,
we explore another possible reason and argue that attitudes might be much more accurate and in
line with theoretical expectations if the costs of redistribution and welfare policies are acknowledged.
More specifically, we expect that the strong support for redistribution and the welfare state among
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the rich would be particularly reduced if tax constraints are mentioned before respondents state their
preference. In contrast, poor respondents should be much less affected by these tax constraints as they
usually pay much less taxes.
Hypothesis 4. The effect of tax constraints on welfare state attitudes and support for redistribution is stronger
for those with a high income as the rich are most likely to pay the main part of additional taxes.
3. Materials and Methods
This paper relies on data from the German Internet Panel (GIP). The GIP is based on
bi-monthly online surveys of a random probability sample of the German population aged 16 to
75. Recruitment was conducted offline with face-to-face interviews. Respondents without computer or
internet access were provided with the necessary equipment and training. The response rate in the first
waves of the GIP was 42.1%. A study description and more detailed analyses on the representativeness
of the GIP can be found in Blom et al. [27].
We use five different items, which measure support for redistribution and support for more
or less welfare state spending. These items are standard questions from international comparative
surveys and we rely on the respective wording. The items have been part of different waves of the GIP,
resulting in varying case numbers and years of the survey (see Table 1 for question wording, year of
the survey, and number of observations). Respondents could state their attitude towards these items
on a 5-Point scale, ranging from ‘spend much less’ to ‘spend much more’, for the four spending items,
and on a 5-Point agree-disagree scale, ranging from ‘disagree strongly’ to ‘agree strongly’, for the
redistribution item.
Table 1. Dependent variables.
Question Wording GIP Wave and Year of Survey Observations
Would you like to see more or less government spending on . . .
. . . pensions Wave 10 (March 2014) 992 *
. . . healthcare Wave 10 (March 2014) 992 *
. . . long term care Wave 27 (January 2017) 2867 **
. . . unemployment benefits Wave 10 (March 2014) 992 *
Please say to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statement: The government should take measures to
reduce differences in income levels
Support for redistribution Wave 21 (January 2016) 3198 ***
* [28], ** [29], *** [30].
The experimental treatment, which we use to prime tax concerns, consists of a reminder that says
that respondents should remember that, if they prefer more spending, it might require a tax increase to
pay for it. In the redistribution question, respondents are reminded that, if they support measures to
reduce differences in income levels, these measures might require a tax increase (for a similar design
see [7,17]). Such priced items are the standard way to capture spending preferences (for example, in the
ISSP), but other items, such as support for redistribution or support for the government’s responsibility,
are usually asked unpriced or unconstrained (see also [3]). Respondents were randomly assigned
to answer either the priced or the unpriced survey question. In Appendix A (Table A1) we provide
balance checks, which suggest that randomization has worked as expected.
Whereas the main part of our analysis will rely on simple comparisons of the differences in average
support between the treatment and control group, we are also interested in whether social groups react
differently to our treatment. We argued that income, as a proxy for self-interest, and political ideology,
as an indicator for the values perspective, are the most relevant moderators in this respect. We use
self-reported personal monthly income and distinguish between respondents with an individual net
income below 1000 € (low), 1000–2000 € (middle), 2000–3000 € (high), and above 3000 € (very high).
We use an 11-point left-right scale to capture respondents’ political ideology. We recode this variable in
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three groups to identify people with a left political ideology (1–4), a centre political ideology (5–7),
and a right political ideology (8–11). We add those that answered ‘don’t know’ as a fourth group.
Moreover, previous research has identified several other individual characteristics, which are
correlated with income or political ideology, but also with support for the welfare state [1,5,14,15].
Therefore, we use gender, age in three age categories (below 35, 36–59, and 60 years and over),
education (low, middle, and highest level of school education), and employment status (in work,
retired, unemployed, other (i.e., in education, doing housework, on leave)) as further control variables
in the multivariate analysis.
4. Results
We start our analysis with a simple comparison of the average support for each of the four
spending items and the standard question on redistribution preferences and specifically focus on the
differences between the unpriced (white dots, control group) and the priced questions (black dots,
treatment group). Since we have randomly assigned respondents either to the treatment or control
group, this difference tells us something about the causal effect of the tax constraint on attitudes.
As Figure 1 shows, we find the highest support for more spending in the area of long-term care
followed by the two areas of the welfare state, which have usually been those with the highest
popularity, pensions, and health care. The German public is much more critical about additional
spending on unemployment benefits where, on average, respondents would prefer to spend the same
as now. Although support for redistribution is measured on a differently labeled scale—a 5-point
agree-disagree scale and not a 5-point spending scale—and answers might, therefore, not be directly
comparable, the lower support for redistribution compared to healthcare or pensions is in line with
what deservingness criteria would suggest, i.e., the old and sick people are perceived as more deserving
than the poor.
Figure 1. The effect of tax concerns on support for welfare state spending and redistribution.
Our main interest is, of course, how the treatment—mentioning the tax constraint—affects
support for spending and for redistribution. In general, our results confirm previous findings that
tax constraints reduce support for additional spending in all four policy areas and also lead to lower
support for redistribution. The effect on additional spending on healthcare, pensions, and long-term
care is very small though and is not significantly different from zero. A t-test further supports the
graphical results. Differences in the mean support are small and not statistically different from zero for
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pensions (−0.05, t-statistic: 1.10, n.s.), healthcare (−0.06,1.05, n.s.), and long term care (−0.03, 1.00, n.s.),
whereas the tax constraint leads to lower support for unemployment benefits (−0.15, 2.68, p < 0.01) and
less support for redistribution (−0.27, 6.36, p < 0.001). As we have argued, this suggests that support
for policies that provide rather universal benefit entitlement and insure against quite common risks
(like illness or old age) are not affected by tax constraints and people maintain their strong support for
additional spending even if they are made aware of the costs. In contrast, support for policies that
provide more concentrated benefits—i.e., to the unemployed or the poor—is significantly lower if tax
constraints are mentioned. Here, it seems that there is a large share of people who want something
for nothing: Spending for unemployment benefits and for redistribution is only supported if it is for
free. One should keep in mind though that our experimental design follows the logic of a priming
experiment. We do not assume that respondents in the control group do not take into account the costs
of their policy preferences at all, but we do assume that the salience of these tax concerns is higher
in the treatment group in which we explicitly mention them. Hence, we cannot completely rule out
that the variation in treatment effects between policy areas might also be the result of already existing
differences in the salience of tax concerns between these policy areas.
In Table 2, we confirm these findings by providing the results of five different linear regression
models for each of the dependent variables. * We further include a set of covariates and show that
the effect of the treatment is robust to the inclusion of these covariates. We do not think that such
an alternative estimation strategy, and the inclusion of covariates, is necessary if the treatment has been
randomly assigned. Nevertheless, we will use these regression models when we examine whether
the treatment has different effects across political ideology or income groups. Therefore, this can be
mainly seen as a preparatory analysis and we will only very briefly summarize the main findings,
which confirm previous findings in the literature. Political ideology has the expected effect and
right-leaning respondents show less support for welfare state spending and for redistribution. For three
of the five items, income has the expected effect and the rich are more critical about greater spending
for pensions and unemployment benefits than the poor and want less redistribution. In contrast,
spending for healthcare and for long term care is equally popular among all income groups.
Table 2. Spending preferences and support for redistribution - individual level determinants.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pensions Healthcare Long-Term Care Unemployment Benefits Redistribution
Treatment: Tax concern −0.046 (0.053) −0.065 (0.057) 0.000 (0.033) −0.136 * (0.060) −0.258 ** (0.045)
Political ideology: Left ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
Centre −0.210 ** (0.063) −0.060 (0.069) −0.173 ** (0.039) −0.233 ** (0.073) −0.487 ** (0.053)
Right −0.359 ** (0.085) −0.193 * (0.093) −0.256 ** (0.052) -0.478 ** (0.097) −0.810 ** (0.073)
Don’t know −0.120 (0.097) −0.017 (0.103) −0.100 (0.063) −0.170 (0.111) −0.629 ** (0.084)
Income: Low ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
Middle −0.039 (0.074) −0.034 (0.081) 0.072 (0.049) −0.257 ** (0.086) −0.039 (0.066)
High −0.229 ** (0.088) −0.077 (0.096) 0.009 (0.056) −0.238 * (0.101) −0.357 ** (0.076)
Very high −0.350 ** (0.107) −0.181 (0.117) −0.110 (0.064) −0.317 * (0.123) −0.541 ** (0.088)
Age: <35 ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
35–59 0.058 (0.073) −0.150 (0.080) −0.073 (0.045) 0.289 ** (0.083) −0.019 (0.062)
60+ 0.039 (0.111) −0.076 (0.123) −0.018 (0.070) 0.375 ** (0.126) −0.014 (0.099)
Female −0.104 (0.058) 0.163 ** (0.063) 0.030 (0.036) −0.059 (0.066) −0.222 ** (0.049)
Employment status: in
work ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
retired 0.008 (0.110) −0.056 (0.121) −0.047 (0.066) 0.116 (0.124) 0.055 (0.095)
unemployed 0.093 (0.181) 0.300 (0.199) −0.019 (0.129) 0.303 (0.203) 0.203 (0.147)
in education, housework −0.041 (0.092) −0.147 (0.098) 0.035 (0.060) 0.141 (0.103) −0.042 (0.083)
Education: Low ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
Middle −0.109 (0.078) −0.160 (0.085) −0.052 (0.049) −0.020 (0.088) 0.053 (0.068)
High −0.121 (0.078) −0.300 **(0.085) −0.086 (0.048) −0.025 (0.089) 0.066 (0.067)
_cons 4.066 ** (0.127) 3.984 ** (0.139) 4.020 ** (0.078) 3.183 ** (0.147) 4.140 ** (0.106)
n 751 764 2135 724 2416
Standard errors in parentheses. Linear Regression Coefficients shown with standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05,
** p < 0.01.
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4.1. Political Ideology, Tax Concerns, and Support for Redistribution
We argued that pre-existing attitudes towards taxation might moderate how people react to the
treatment. We expected that, in particular, people with a right political ideology who are more critical
about taxes would react the most to the tax constraints. To test whether the treatment effect differs between
people with a right and those with a left political ideology, we include an interaction effect between the
treatment and the political ideology variable in the linear regression models and then estimate the marginal
effect of the treatment for each partisan group (Table 3). Our analysis shows that left-leaning respondents
reduce their level of support if we prime tax constraints and, furthermore, we find such an effect for pension
spending preferences. We do not find evidence that respondents with a right political ideology differ
significantly in how they react to tax constraints. Contrary to our expectations, tax constraints sometimes
even seem to have a weaker effect on spending preferences for right-leaning respondents in particular if we
look at spending preferences for pensions and at support for redistribution. Our results, therefore, show that
adding tax constraints do not lead to more considerate attitudes, which are more in line with theoretical
expectations, but rather decrease partisan differences.
Table 3. Marginal effect of the tax constraint across partisan groups.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pensions Healthcare Long-Term Care Unemployment Benefits Redistribution
Left −0.231 * (0.097). −0.118 (0.105) −0.013 (0.061) −0.127 (0.112) −0.292 ** (0.081)
Centre 0.044 (0.079) −0.002 (0.086) −0.053 (0.048) −0.163 (0.090) −0.256 ** (0.067)
Right −0.056 (0.136) −0.152 (0.149) 0.103 (0.083) −0.141 (0.154) −0.189 (0.119)
Don’t know 0.099 (0.162) −0.074 (0.175) 0.058 (0.105) −0.039 (0.187) −0.256 (0.143)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
n 751 764 2192 724 2416
Standard errors in parentheses. Based on linear regression models. All models include a set of covariates (age, gender,
education, employment status, and income). * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
4.2. Income, Tax Concerns, and Support for Redistribution
Previous research has shown that non-users of welfare services are much more likely to want
something for nothing and, consequently, reduce their support for welfare much more when made
aware of the costs of the welfare state [8]. Following a similar logic, we expected that those who would
be economically much more affected by tax increases, the high income earners, would show stronger
reactions to tax constraints and would reduce support for the welfare state and for redistribution
more than low income earners. To explore the moderating effect of income on the strength of the
tax constraint, we estimate linear regression models for each of the dependent variables and include
the respective interaction effects between the treatment and the four income categories. In Table 4,
we provide the marginal effects of the treatment across income groups.
Table 4. Marginal effect of the tax constraint across income groups.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pensions Healthcare Long-Term Care Unemployment Benefits Redistribution
Low income 0.105 (0.100). −0.218 * (0.109) −0.021 (0.066) 0.032 (0.117) −0.161 (0.087)
Middle income −0.203 * (0.085) −0.223 * (0.092) −0.031 (0.054) −0.289 ** (0.098) −0.270 ** (0.076)
High income 0.069 (0.111) 0.079 (0.121) −0.027 (0.065) −0.017 (0.129) −0.329 ** (0.090)
Very high income −0.194 (0.172) 0.391 * (0.155) 060 (0.078) −0.264 (0.164) −0.280 * (0.110)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
n 766 779 2192 738 2469
Standard errors in parentheses. Based on linear regression models. All models include a set of covariates (age, gender,
education, employment status and political ideology). * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
First, we find no difference between the income groups for long-term care (Model 3) as none of
the income groups withdraws its support for spending on long-term care when made aware about the
tax consequences. For spending on pensions, spending on unemployment benefits, and support for
redistribution, we find evidence for the expected moderating effect of income. Higher income leads to
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stronger negative reactions to the tax constraint. Whereas the low income group does not significantly
reduce its support for spending on pensions (+0.105, n.s.), on unemployment benefits (+0.032, n.s.), and for
redistribution (−0.161, n.s.), we find stronger negative and often significant reactions to the tax constraint
for the other income groups. It seems that, in particular, the middle income group is very sensitive
to tax constraints (see also [31,32]). Finally, we have to note that support for healthcare seems to be
an outlier. Here, the low and middle income groups react strongest to the tax constraints (−0.218 [p < 0.05]
and −0.223 [p < 0.05]), the high income group is not affected in its support, and respondents with very
high income even increase their support in the treatment group. Thus, the observed income gradient
in the unpriced item (i.e., high income is associated with lower support) disappears if we look at the
priced healthcare item. Particularities of the German health insurance system might provide one possible
explanation for this finding. In Germany, high income earners whose income is above a certain threshold
have the right to opt out of the statutory contribution and tax financed health insurance and buy private
health insurance instead. We must admit, though, that this is more likely to be another reason to be much
more sensitive to tax increases for high income earners who would have to pay part of these taxes, but would
not benefit from improvements or lower contributions to the public health insurance system. So, whereas we
are not able to provide an explanation for this unexpected finding, we will take this puzzle as a starting
point to discuss implications for future research in the conclusion.
5. Discussion
This article explored whether support for the welfare state and for redistribution is subject to tax
constraints. Are respondents willing to pay for their preferred level of welfare state spending or do they
engage in trade-offs when forming their welfare state and redistribution preferences? Following up on
a long-standing, but sometimes neglected, line of public opinion research [7,17,18] and contributing
to recent trends in welfare state research [14,23,33], we have shown that tax constraints lead to lower
aggregate support for the welfare state. But our results clearly show that such trade-offs between
spending and taxes do not apply to all areas of the welfare state and might only be relevant for policies
that provide concentrated benefits for some people, such as unemployment benefits or redistribution,
social investment [14], or family policy [8]. In contrast, support for more universal programs, such as
pensions, long-term care, or healthcare, are not affected by mentioning their fiscal costs. We will
discuss the research and policy implications of these findings.
First, our findings add to recent discussions about the reliability of unpriced items. On the one
hand, our results reduce concerns about using unpriced items as we have shown that adding a price
tag does not affect support across all areas of the welfare state. Moreover, our subgroup analysis of
partisan and income groups shows that priced items do not seem to lead to more considerate attitudes
and patterns of attitudes that are more in line with our theoretical expectations. On the other hand,
the observed differences between policy areas add much more complexity to this issue and makes it even
more complicated to decide whether to use priced or unpriced items. At a minimum, research needs
to be aware about these differences when one compares existing findings, which are based on priced
items (e.g., spending preferences in the ISSP), and unpriced items (e.g., the government’s responsibility
items in the ESS or redistribution preferences in almost all surveys). Of course, our results and some
of the unexpected findings, which left us without an explanation, call for more research to improve
our understanding of the potential trade-offs respondents might make when forming their attitudes.
One problem which arises here is that explicitly adding one constraint or trade-off—in our case, between
additional spending and taxes—might encourage respondents to think also about other possible trade-offs.
Increasing deficits or cutting other welfare state programs are two other alternatives to finance more
spending [14,17]. Also, adding a tax constraint raises awareness that someone has to pay for the additional
spending, but it remains open to the respondents’ interpretation of who should pay [23]. Conjoint analysis
and vignettes [33], but also more qualitative methods, are promising methodological techniques to
complement the standard survey research in this field [34,35].
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Second, our findings, together with previous studies on tax constraints, have implications for policy
making. It seems that rather universal, ‘old’ social policies, such as pensions or healthcare, retain a high
level of support even if their costs are made very salient. In contrast, more needs-based, ‘new’ social policies,
such as social investment and childcare support, but perhaps also redistribution, lose quite some support if
their costs are salient. For the old policies, this suggests that retrenchment is very difficult as support for
spending, and, consequently, opposition to cut backs, remains high even if this leads to higher taxes. For the
new policies, policy makers are faced with the challenge that they are popular, but that their popularity and
support for their expansion is very sensitive to tax increases as a “something for nothing”-preference is much
more common in these areas of the welfare state. Future work should try to develop a better understanding
of the specific reasons for this kind of attitude towards new social policies (see for example [7]) as this might
provide important insights under which circumstances such reforms are successful.
Funding: Funding was provided by the German Research Foundation (DFG) via SFB 884, project A6.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
Appendix
Table A1. Balance check between treatment and control group—Logistic regression.
(Experiment 1) (Experiment 2) (Experiment 3)


























High −0.063 −0.043 −0.116
(0.208) (0.114) (0.124)



















n 932 3014 2661
We estimated logistic regressions with treatment assignment as the dependent variable and included each
independent variable in a single model. Each row thus represents the results of a separate logistic regression.
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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